Showing posts with label Indian military. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Indian military. Show all posts
Monday, November 23, 2009
IAF lost 36 aircraft, 32 lives in plane crashes since 2006
New Delhi: The IAF has lost 36 aircraft and seven helicopters in accidents during a period of nearly four years beginning 2006 as 32 persons, including IAF personnel, were killed in the mishaps, the Lok Sabha was told today.
Sunday, November 22, 2009
A look at the Defence Arena
Night launch for N-capable Agni-II today (Asia Defence)
SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 22, 2009
India is all set to test its 2,000-km-plus Agni-II missile from the Wheeler Island off Orissa coast again on Monday. Significantly, the nuclear-capable missile will be launched for the first time during night in a major step towards making it fully operational in the Strategic Forces Command (SFC).
Defence officials said Agni-II’s ‘user training trial’ was likely to be conducted around 8pm on Monday to give the necessary confidence to the armed forces that the two-stage, solid-fuelled missile can be fired whenever required.
Incidentally, DRDO is also working on MIRV (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles) technology for the Agni series of ballistic missiles. An ‘MIRVed’ missile can carry a bunch of nuclear warheads in a single payload, each of which can hit different targets along separate trajectories.
Such missiles can conceivably overwhelm even robust ballistic missile defences of an enemy. MIRV technology is considered important for a country like India, which has a clear no first-use nuclear doctrine but warns that nuclear retaliation to an enemy first-strike will be ‘massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage’.
Pakistan, with the active help of China and North Korea, has surged ahead of India in the missile arena. Some US nuclear experts recently estimated that Pakistan has more nuclear warheads than India. As per their estimates, it has 70-90 warheads compared to 60-80 of India.
China is in a different league altogether, brandishing as it does ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles) like Dong Feng-31A (11,200-km range) and SLBMs (submarine-launched ballistic missiles) like JL-2 (7,200-km range).
But coming back to the Agni-II test, it will take place only if all the pre-launch final checks go smoothly as planned on Monday. The missile, which is around 20-metre tall and weighs 17 tonnes, was earlier to be tested on November 6 but it was called off at the last moment due to some glitches.
Even Agni-II’s last test on May 19 was not fully successful. Consequently, the only ballistic missiles which can be said to be “100% operational” at present are the short-range Prithvi missile (150-350 km) and, to a certain extent, the 700-km-range Agni-I. The fourth test of 3,500-km Agni-III, which will give India the strategic capability to hit targets deep inside China once it becomes fully operational by around 2012, will take place early next year.
India’s most ambitious strategic missile Agni-V will be ready for its first test only in end-2010 or early-2011. With a proposed range of 5,000-km, Agni-V will have near ICBM capabilities (strike range in excess of 5,500-km) and give India’s “dissuasive deterrence posture” against China some much-needed muscle.
Friday, September 25, 2009
The ABC of N-subs
A LARGE number of "experts" have written numerous articles after India's strategic nuclear submarine, Arihant, was launched on July 26, 2009 by Mrs Gursharan Kaur, wife of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Also, nuclear scientists proudly unveiled the "half boat", or the shore-based miniaturised nuclear reactor, at Kalpakkam on July 29, 2009.
Earlier, in February 2008, the Defence Research and Development Organisation made an unprecedented announcement in the press about the testing of an SLBM (submarine launched ballastic missile).
In my opinion, the unnecessary publicity given to these three events should have been avoided.
Unfortunately, in a hurry to get individual achievements lauded, a lot of premature and needless publicity was given. Hopefully, this project will fructify as planned, without the recent "fizzle" controversy surrounding our 1998 thermonuclear test.
Let us begin with the miniaturised reactor (known as PWR or pressurised water reactor, similar to the light water reactors, being imported for civilian power plants after the Indo-US nuclear deal of 2008).
Common sense dictates that a submarine crew living, eating and working within 20 to 50 metres of the submarine reactor needs to be "safe" from radioactive materials, that is, alpha and beta particles and gamma radiation. Hence, the submarine reactor must be safe, simple, rugged and capable of operating in all situations that a nuclear submarine encounters on surface and underwater.
Secondly, it must be silent. This stealth is achieved by ensuring that the number of pumps, specially the PHT pumps (primary heat transfer pumps), that re-circulate the "closed" first loop radioactive water between the reactor core and the steam boilers, are reduced to a minimum or, in some cases, not used at low submarine speeds by having a "convection system" which does the work of the PHT pumps.
Till the '70s, nuclear submarines used two reactors, each with steam boilers and PHT pumps for redundancy though these added to the radiated noise.
But once reactor reliability was established, most advanced nations now use a single reactor for more silent operations. Theoretically, a single reliable PWR reactor, with a single steam boiler and a single PHT pump, would produce the least noise.
The second issue mentioned by "experts" is the reactor life and how the Americans have been operating their ninth generation submarine reactors with 25-year life spans, as compared to the rest of the world. Our "experts" should remember that the world's first nuclear submarine, the American USS Nautilius, had a reactor core life of only two years. There is no doubt that the Americans are 50 years ahead of India in this regard, but we must understand that a safe submarine reactor requires a combination of metallurgy and enriched Uranium-235 (U-235) to achieve longer reactor life. And this data is a closely-guarded secret for obvious reasons.
Some articles in the Indian media, about using 80 to 93 per cent enriched U-235 in a submarine reactor core, are incorrect.
The third issue mentioned by the "experts" is the reactor power and why we need an SSBN to have higher reactor power to transit at a speed of 30 knots.
Reactor power, as indicated, is thermal and not electrical (eg 100 MW is 100 megawatts of thermal power). Most SSBNs need a transit speed of below 20 knots since their task is to avoid contact with enemy warships and submarines and launch their SLBMs when ordered in a second strike.
Given our geographical location vis-à-vis our two nuclear-armed adversaries, an SSBN with a speed of 20 to 24 knots, but with SLBMs of about 5,000-km range, should suffice. It should be noted that SSNs (or tactical nuclear attack submarines), which are required to search and sink enemy warships and submarines, would need higher speeds (over 30 knots, which, depending on the SSN size, would require a single reactor of 160 to 200 MW or two reactors, each of about 80 to 100 MW).
There are a few other factors which decide submarine stealth -- improved shock mounts, "rafting" (where the reactor and machinery are not in direct contact with the pressure hull), hydrodynamic hull shape, skewed propellers or the new pump jet propulsion system, "static" electrical machinery, anechoic tiling, silent weapon and garbage discharge systems among others). Similarly, greater diving depths are a combination of metallurgy, pressure hull thickness and frame spacing (steel frames are the inner skeletons which, along with the keel, provide support to the pressure hull.
Also, in the case of two "similar" steel-hulled submarines, the one with a thicker pressure hull and "closer, thicker frame spacing" would dive deeper, but would pay a penalty in loss of some speed.
Diving depths of submarines are a closely guarded secret, as are noise figures and weapon-firing depths. A nuclear submarine also needs a system to generate oxygen and absorb carbon dioxide and other gases to enable human beings to live and operate in demanding conditions underwater. Production of drinkable sea water and the ability to get rid of garbage (food and human waste) are equally important and technologically demanding.
Our scientists and the Navy personnel involved in work on the Arihant have indeed achieved a major milestone. However, much more needs to be done, and I hope it is done without any unwise and unnecessary publicity.
In addition, India now also needs to begin work on a faster, deeper-diving SSN (tactical nuclear attack submarine) to provide its Navy with a major sea denial capability in the vast expanses of the Indian Ocean.
This SSN will require a single 160 to 200 MW reactor and improved stealth and complex metallurgy. We are beginners in the field of nuclear submarines and have a lot of catching up to do before we start celebrating. VICE-ADMIRAL ARUN KUMAR SINGH retired as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command, Visakhapatnam
Earlier, in February 2008, the Defence Research and Development Organisation made an unprecedented announcement in the press about the testing of an SLBM (submarine launched ballastic missile).
In my opinion, the unnecessary publicity given to these three events should have been avoided.
The nation -- in keeping with worldwide practice -- should have announced only the commissioning, post-successful sea and weapon trials of the Arihant, which is the first in its class.
Unfortunately, in a hurry to get individual achievements lauded, a lot of premature and needless publicity was given. Hopefully, this project will fructify as planned, without the recent "fizzle" controversy surrounding our 1998 thermonuclear test.
This article tries to explain, in simple terms, the unclassified, but misunderstood mysteries of a nuclear submarine.
Let us begin with the miniaturised reactor (known as PWR or pressurised water reactor, similar to the light water reactors, being imported for civilian power plants after the Indo-US nuclear deal of 2008).
Common sense dictates that a submarine crew living, eating and working within 20 to 50 metres of the submarine reactor needs to be "safe" from radioactive materials, that is, alpha and beta particles and gamma radiation. Hence, the submarine reactor must be safe, simple, rugged and capable of operating in all situations that a nuclear submarine encounters on surface and underwater.
Secondly, it must be silent. This stealth is achieved by ensuring that the number of pumps, specially the PHT pumps (primary heat transfer pumps), that re-circulate the "closed" first loop radioactive water between the reactor core and the steam boilers, are reduced to a minimum or, in some cases, not used at low submarine speeds by having a "convection system" which does the work of the PHT pumps.
Till the '70s, nuclear submarines used two reactors, each with steam boilers and PHT pumps for redundancy though these added to the radiated noise.
But once reactor reliability was established, most advanced nations now use a single reactor for more silent operations. Theoretically, a single reliable PWR reactor, with a single steam boiler and a single PHT pump, would produce the least noise.
The second issue mentioned by "experts" is the reactor life and how the Americans have been operating their ninth generation submarine reactors with 25-year life spans, as compared to the rest of the world. Our "experts" should remember that the world's first nuclear submarine, the American USS Nautilius, had a reactor core life of only two years. There is no doubt that the Americans are 50 years ahead of India in this regard, but we must understand that a safe submarine reactor requires a combination of metallurgy and enriched Uranium-235 (U-235) to achieve longer reactor life. And this data is a closely-guarded secret for obvious reasons.
Some articles in the Indian media, about using 80 to 93 per cent enriched U-235 in a submarine reactor core, are incorrect.
This use of weapon grade U-235, may, under some emergent situations, "convert" a reactor into a fission bomb by making the transition from "critical" to "super critical" stage during operations.
We should be happy that our scientists have made a submarine reactor (irrespective of whether it is a few generations behind the Americans and Russians). The important thing here is to see how the reactor operates in harbour and sea trials. Based on this initial experience, improvements can be made to the life and stealth qualities of this reactor.
The third issue mentioned by the "experts" is the reactor power and why we need an SSBN to have higher reactor power to transit at a speed of 30 knots.
Reactor power, as indicated, is thermal and not electrical (eg 100 MW is 100 megawatts of thermal power). Most SSBNs need a transit speed of below 20 knots since their task is to avoid contact with enemy warships and submarines and launch their SLBMs when ordered in a second strike.
Given our geographical location vis-à-vis our two nuclear-armed adversaries, an SSBN with a speed of 20 to 24 knots, but with SLBMs of about 5,000-km range, should suffice. It should be noted that SSNs (or tactical nuclear attack submarines), which are required to search and sink enemy warships and submarines, would need higher speeds (over 30 knots, which, depending on the SSN size, would require a single reactor of 160 to 200 MW or two reactors, each of about 80 to 100 MW).
There are a few other factors which decide submarine stealth -- improved shock mounts, "rafting" (where the reactor and machinery are not in direct contact with the pressure hull), hydrodynamic hull shape, skewed propellers or the new pump jet propulsion system, "static" electrical machinery, anechoic tiling, silent weapon and garbage discharge systems among others). Similarly, greater diving depths are a combination of metallurgy, pressure hull thickness and frame spacing (steel frames are the inner skeletons which, along with the keel, provide support to the pressure hull.
For example, an expensive titanium-hulled submarine can dive to twice the depth of a modern steel-hulled submarine.
Also, in the case of two "similar" steel-hulled submarines, the one with a thicker pressure hull and "closer, thicker frame spacing" would dive deeper, but would pay a penalty in loss of some speed.
Diving depths of submarines are a closely guarded secret, as are noise figures and weapon-firing depths. A nuclear submarine also needs a system to generate oxygen and absorb carbon dioxide and other gases to enable human beings to live and operate in demanding conditions underwater. Production of drinkable sea water and the ability to get rid of garbage (food and human waste) are equally important and technologically demanding.
Our scientists and the Navy personnel involved in work on the Arihant have indeed achieved a major milestone. However, much more needs to be done, and I hope it is done without any unwise and unnecessary publicity.
In addition, India now also needs to begin work on a faster, deeper-diving SSN (tactical nuclear attack submarine) to provide its Navy with a major sea denial capability in the vast expanses of the Indian Ocean.
This SSN will require a single 160 to 200 MW reactor and improved stealth and complex metallurgy. We are beginners in the field of nuclear submarines and have a lot of catching up to do before we start celebrating. VICE-ADMIRAL ARUN KUMAR SINGH retired as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command, Visakhapatnam
Sunday, September 13, 2009
What's the difference between a bomb, a missile, and a rocket?
A Bomb is unpowered (though they can be guided)
A Rocket is powered, but unguided.
A Missile is powered and guided.
There are exceptions to these definitions in that they only hold true for modern weapons of war.
An arrow is also termed a missile, though it is unpowered and unguided (after it has left the bow).
Space borne rockets are both powered and guided (unless they are ICBMs in which case they are modern weapons of war and termed missiles).
A Rocket is powered, but unguided.
A Missile is powered and guided.
There are exceptions to these definitions in that they only hold true for modern weapons of war.
An arrow is also termed a missile, though it is unpowered and unguided (after it has left the bow).
Space borne rockets are both powered and guided (unless they are ICBMs in which case they are modern weapons of war and termed missiles).
Thursday, September 3, 2009
Pokhran-II
Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Pokharan-II refers to test explosions of five nuclear devices, three on 11 May and two on 13 May 1998, conducted by India at the Pokhran test range. These nuclear tests resulted in a variety of sanctions against India by a number of major states. On 18 May 1974 India exploded its first nuclear device code named Smiling Buddha. After about a quarter century, on Buddha Jayanti, 11 May 1998, Operation Shakti was carried out. Shakti (शक्ति in Sanskrit meaning 'Strength'), is also the name of the Hindu Goddess of strength. Shakti was the codename for Pokhran-II.
Test team
The main technical personnel involved in the operation were:
Project Chief Coordinators
- Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam (later, President of India), Scientific Adviser to the Prime Minister and Head of the DRDO.
- Dr. R. Chidambaram, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Atomic energy.
Development and test teams
Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC)
- Dr. Anil Kakodkar, Director of BARC.
- Dr. Satinder Kumar Sikka, Director; Thermonuclear Weapon Development.
- Dr. M.S. Ramkumar, Director of Nuclear Fuel and Automation Manufacturing Group; Director, Nuclear Component Manufacture.
- Dr. D.D. Sood, Director of Radiochemistry and Isotope Group; Director, Nuclear Materials Acquisition.
- Dr. S.K. Gupta, Solid State Physics and Spectroscopy Group; Director, Device Design & Assessment.
- Dr. G. Govindraj, Associate Director of Electronic and Instrumentation Group; Director, Field Instrumentation.
Defence Research & Development Organization (DRDO)
- Dr. K. Santhanam; Director, Test Site Preparations.
- Dr. M.Vasudev; Range Safety Officer.
A total of five nuclear weapons were detonated at Pokhran during Operation Shakti. They are:
Shakti I
A two stage thermonuclear device with a boosted fission primary, its yield was downgraded from 200 KT(theoretical) to 45 KT for test purposes. The thermonuclear device tested at Pokhran was not an actual warhead. It was a device that was designed mainly to produce data to analyze the performance of India's Hydrogen bomb technology for future computer simulations and actual weaponisation. Dr. K. Santhanam, has disputed the claimed yield of this test, by stating that the Hydrogen Bomb was a fizzle. This has lead to an uproar in Indian nuclear and defense circles with arguments and counterarguments in favor of a re-test series.
Shakti II
A pure fission device using the Plutonium implosion design with a yield of 15 KT. The device tested was an actual nuclear warhead that can be delivered by bombers or fighters and also mounted on a missile. The warhead was an improved, lightweight and miniaturized version of the device tested in 1974. Scientists at BARC had been working to improve the 1974 design for many years. Data from the 1974 test was used to carry out computer simulations using the indigenous Param supercomputer to improve the design. The 1998 test was intended to prove the validity of the improved designs.
Shakti III
An experimental boosted fission device that used reactor grade Plutonium for its primary with a yield of 0.3 KT. This test device was used to test only the primary stage. It did not contain any tritium required to boost the fission. This test was designed to study the possibility of using reactor grade plutonium in warheads and also to prove India's expertise in controlling and damping a nuclear explosion in order to achieve a low (sub-kiloton) yield.
Shakti IV
A 0.5 KT experimental device. The test's only purpose was to collect data about the explosion process and to study the performance of various bomb components.
Shakti V
A 0.2 KT experimental device that used U-233, an isotope of uranium not found in nature and produced in India's fast breeder reactors that consume Thorium. This device too was used to collect data.
Production and Preparation of Devices
Three laboratories of the DRDO were involved in designing, testing and producing components like advanced detonators, the implosion systems, high-voltage trigger systems. They were also responsible for weaponization, systems engineering, aerodynamics, safety interlocks and flight trials. The nuclear devices were moved from their vaults at the BARC complex in the early hours of 1 May, around 3 a.m., by four Indian Army trucks under the command of Col. Umang Kapur. They were transported to Mumbai airport and flown at dawn in an Indian Air Force AN-32 transport plane to the Jaisalmer military base. An Army convoy of four trucks transported the explosive devices to Pokhran. Three trips were required to complete the delivery of the devices and associated equipment. The devices were delivered directly to the device preparation building in the range which was designated as the 'Prayer Hall'.
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